Judgments of affordances, the potential actions that an observer can carry out within an environment, require observers to relate information about their body to information in the environment. Although humans can accurately judge affordances for others, it is unknown whether other people's capability to act influences one's own affordance judgments. Based on theoretical accounts and recent empirical evidence highlighting the importance of social information in perception and action, we hypothesized that the action capabilities of another person would influence one's own affordance judgments. Participants judged their own and another's ability to pass through an aperture in 3 experiments that varied the differences in body sizes between the participant and another agent using naturally occurring body size differences or an artificial large body suit. Results showed an influence of the other's body size on self-affordance judgments only when the participant and the other agent remained in their natural body size (Experiment 3), but not when the body size differences between the participant and the other agent were extreme because of the body suit (Experiments 1 and 2).
theory of affordances claims that observers perceive the environment in terms of opportunities for action by discovering and then relating properties of the environment to one's body properties and action capabilities, including body size. For example, a chair affords sitting so long as the height of the seat is shorter than the length of one's legs (Mark & Vogele, 1987) . Although the definition of affordance is debated (Stoffregen, 2004) , the main premise remains that affordances capture the fit between the observer's ability to act and the object or environmental properties that surround the observer (Warren, 1984) . A plethora of research supports Gibson's claims by showing that the size of an observer's body influences action-based estimates as well as real actions in spaces both near and far from them (Ishak, Adolph, & Lin, 2008; Mark & Vogele, 1987; Stefanucci & Geuss, 2010; Warren & Whang, 1987) .
Humans evolved into a very social species in part because our ancestors benefitted from working together as a collective to achieve a common goal (e.g., resource protection, child rearing). To successfully work together, we must have evolved the capacity to judge the potential action capabilities of others. From an ecological perspective, Gibson's (1979) original conception of affordances suggests that opportunities for action can be perceived from many viewpoints; therefore, we may be able to perceive affordances for others, even if we do not share their viewpoint. Joint action research suggests that when two individuals interact for cooperative (e.g., Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) or competitive (e.g., Ruys & Aarts, 2010) purposes, both actors incorporate the other's actions into their own action system. As an example, Isenhower, Richardson, Carello, Baron, and Marsh (2010) asked pairs of participants with matched or mismatched arm spans to move planks of varying lengths from one location to another. Participants were told that they could complete this task alone or together. The authors found that participants transitioned from single to joint action when the participant with the shorter arm span could no longer complete the task alone, demonstrating that observers are able to predict the action capabilities of others to achieve a common goal.
The context of joint action is a rather special case of the many socially focused adaptive problems that humans faced throughout our evolutionary history. More broadly, working in groups often requires assigning different tasks to different individuals even when these tasks are completed alone, implying that humans have the capacity to accurately assess the potential action capabilities of others without performing actions together or previously observing the other perform the given action. Indeed, previous research has shown that people are able to accurately judge what another person can reach (Rochat, 1995) , sit on (Stoffregen, Gorday, Sheng, & Flynn, 1999) , and reach by jumping (Ramenzoni, Riley, Davis, Shockley, & Armstrong, 2008 ; see also Creem-Regehr, Gagnon, Geuss, & Stefanucci, 2013 , for a review). Generally, when observers are provided with sufficient visual or kinematic information to determine another's capabilities, they are fairly accurate in reporting another's affordances (see, e.g., Ramenzoni et al., 2008; Stof-fregen et al., 1999) , even when this person's action capabilities differ from the observer's own action capabilities (Ramenzoni, Riley, Shockley, & Davis, 2008a) . Ramenzoni, Davis, Riley, and Shockley (2010) found that judgments about another's maximum jumping reach could be improved if the participant observed the other person perform a similar action (e.g., lifting a weight by squatting), but not when they observed the other person perform a nonrelated action (e.g., rotating at the torso). This research suggests that observers identify information about the other's action capabilities to make accurate judgments about this other person's affordances. Ramenzoni, Riley, Shockley, and Davis (2008b) also investigated whether observers may partially rely on information about their own action capabilities to infer the action capabilities of others. To do so, they asked participants to make maximum jumping-reach height estimates for themselves and for another person. Half of the participants donned ankle weights to alter the information about their own capabilities. The authors found that the participants who wore the ankle weights, and had experience walking around with the weights on, significantly reduced their estimates of maximum jumping-reach heights for both themselves and another, even though the others' ability to act was not altered because they did not wear ankle weights. In general, these experiments demonstrate that observers are capable of predicting the action capabilities for another person, and that observers use information about their own bodies (e.g., eye height optical information or kinematic constraints) as well as information about the other's body (e.g., body size and kinematics) to inform their judgments.
The central question we wished to address is whether the perceived action capabilities of another person influence observers' understanding of their own action capabilities. This complements the research described above, which suggests that observers use their own action capabilities to judge others' affordances. From an ecological perspective, there is no reason why an observer would use information about another person to inform his or her own action capabilities given the availability of information about the observer's own body and the structure of the environment. Yet, from an evolutionary perspective, humans faced both pressures to conform to a group and compete with others for resources and mates. To conform or compete, it was important for observers to alter their own perceived action capabilities in relation to those around them. For example, when deciding to compete over resources with another individual, it can be very costly to engage in competitions that one would likely lose (for review, see Gilbert, Price, & Allan, 1995) . Thus, humans may have evolved a tendency to convince themselves that they are slightly more capable of winning a competition, leading to a greater ability to convince others of their enhanced capabilities, and ultimately increasing the chances that a competitor would back down from a competition, reducing the associated risks of physical conflict (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011) . As a result, observers may alter their own perceived action capabilities in light of the perceived capabilities of another. Therefore, the current research tested the existence of a potentially basic feature of our perception-action system, which likely resulted from recurring adaptive problems that existed at the intersection of our social and perceptual world. Specifically, we wished to test whether the action capabilities of others really do influence an observer's own perceived capabilities. Our intention was to test for the presence of the hypothesized effect and not to differentiate between the possible adaptive problems that gave rise to such an effect.
There is evidence from empirical studies that the action capabilities of another person influence the action system of the observer, in what is often referred to as the visuomotor mapping of another's body to the self (Costantini, Committeri, & Sinigaglia, 2011) . For example, Costantini and colleagues (2011) showed that when an object was presented within the reaching space of a virtual agent, the observer's motor system was primed for a grasping task, even when the object was outside of the observer's own reaching space. This was further supported by the increase of motor-evoked potentials associated with viewing the object within the agent's reaching space (Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2013) . In a different paradigm, Thomas, Press, and Haggard (2006) also found that registering tactile information on one's own body is facilitated when observing a similar visual event occurring on another's body. Together, this work suggests that observers are sensitive to information about another's ability to act, and that this information may facilitate a specific response; however, it was not a direct test of whether observers will alter their perceived action capabilities based on the capabilities of another person. Ramenzoni et al. (2008) provided some initial insight into this question; however, it is important to note that this was not their primary motivation. Participants judged the maximum overhead reach for themselves and another person who was either shorter or taller than they were. Between participants, the observer's eye height was manipulated by requiring the participant to stand on either the floor or two different sized platforms. The main finding was that observers used their own optical eye height information to make judgments about another person's maximum overhead reach. Secondarily, the authors reported a series of regressions that explored the extent to which self-judgments and other judgments were influenced by the maximum overhead reach of the observer and the actor. It was reported that the other's action capabilities accounted for 50%, 52%, and 59% of the variance in judgments about one's own maximum overhead reach. It is unclear whether or not the influence of the other's reachability on one's own perceived reachability was simultaneously modeled with the influence of one's own reachability on the perceived reachability of the other.
Current Experiments
Our primary goal was to provide a systematic investigation of whether observers use information about another's action capabilities to inform judgments about their own actions. In addition, we attempted to replicate previous work demonstrating that observers can accurately judge affordances for themselves and for other people, using the affordance of passing through an aperture. To answer these questions, we assessed self-and other affordance judgments within the same participants and also created three different between-participants scenarios that varied the differences in body sizes between the participant and another agent. Specifically, we varied whether the participant or the other agent (or neither) wore a large body suit. The body suit manipulation allowed us to alter the saliency of body size information and the degree to which the body size information was appropriate for determining self-and other affordances. This design allowed us to analyze within-participant effects of self and other body size This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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information on self-and other affordance judgments, across three different body-manipulation scenarios.
The current experiments used the well-researched affordance of passing through an aperture or gap (i.e., passability), without rotating or touching the sides, from a static viewpoint (Warren & Whang, 1987) . Warren and Whang (1987) first investigated this affordance and demonstrated that from a static viewpoint, observers required an aperture width 1.16 times larger than their shoulder width to indicate an ability to pass. When asked to actually walk through, observers rotated their shoulder to pass through when the aperture was less than 1.3 times their shoulder width. This suggests that observers are capable of making static judgments about their ability to pass through an aperture that are consistent with their actual passability. Passability for others has been examined primarily in the context of dyads with children (Chang, Wade, & Stoffregen, 2009) and adults (Davis, Riley, Shockley, & Cummins-Sebree, 2010) ; thus, an investigation of how well observers can judge passability for a single agent is another contribution of these experiments.
In the following three experiments, participants judged their own ability and another's ability to pass through an aperture. In Experiment 1, we asked participants to wear a large body suit to provide a conceptual replication of the work by Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) in which body capabilities for jumping were manipulated. In Experiment 2, the other wore a large body suit to replicate the large difference in size without changing the observer's body; in Experiment 3, both the participant and the other performed the task in their natural body size.
General Method

Overview
In the following experiments, participants judged whether their own bodies would fit through apertures of various sizes and whether another person's body could pass through these apertures as well. Specifically, participants judged whether they could pass straight through a given aperture width without turning their shoulders or touching the poles. Likewise, when participants were making passability judgments for the other, they judged whether the other person could pass straight through the aperture width without turning his/her shoulders or touching the poles.
Materials and Stimuli
The study was conducted in a large room (11.47 m ϫ 7.02 m) using two large black poles (22.3 cm diameter and 1.83 m tall) as the sides of the aperture. Participants stood 4.5 m from the center of the aperture and viewed it at a 70.5°angle so that they could see both the aperture and the other in their field of view for each trial. The other was also positioned 4.5 m from the aperture and faced it at a 70.5°a
ngle (see Figure 1) . The suit used to manipulate body size for the self or other (Experiments 2 and 3) was purchased from the following website: http://www.halloweencostumes.com. We removed the legs of the suit to make it easier to put on (see Figure 2 ).
Design
In all experiments, participants made judgments of passage for 12 aperture widths, ranging from 30 cm to 85 cm in 5-cm intervals, for both themselves and the other in a blocked design. Order of blocks (self or other) was counterbalanced across participants. Aperture width was randomly presented within each block of judgments. Within a block, each aperture width was presented three times. Thus, every participant performed a total of 72 trials across all blocks. Whether participants or the other wore the body suit was a betweenparticipants manipulation in Experiments 1 (participant wore body suit) and 2 (other wore body suit).
Procedure
Participants arrived at the lab and were randomly assigned to one of two judgment order conditions, self-affordance judgments prior to other affordance judgments, or other affordance judgments prior to self-affordance judgments. Next, all participants were read the task instructions. Participants who were assigned to make self-affordance judgments first were told that they would view various pole widths and should state "yes" if they thought they could walk straight between the two poles without turning their shoulders or touching the poles and "no" if they could not. Participants who were assigned to make other affordance judgments first were told that they would view various pole widths and state "yes" if they thought another person in the room could walk straight between the two poles without turning his/her shoulders or touching the poles and "no" if that person could not. Participants responded "yes" or "no" by pointing to a piece of paper. This was done so that participants did not bias their estimate to please the other. In both conditions, participants also provided ratings regarding the confidence they had in each yes/no response on a 1-5 scale (1 ϭ not at all confident, 5 ϭ 100% confident). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Next, participants were escorted into the experiment room and to a designated mark on the floor, where they remained for the rest of the experiment. The first aperture width and the other were already in their designated positions, and the experimenter stated the task instructions again to the participant. The experimenter also informed the participant that between each trial they would turn around and look at a mark on the wall while the experimenter adjusted the poles.
After three runs through all 12 aperture widths (36 trials), the experimenter informed the participants that they would then begin providing affordance judgments about the other's ability to walk straight through the two poles or their own ability to walk straight through the two poles, depending on judgment order condition. After 36 more affordance judgments, the experimenter debriefed the participant and measured the height, weight, and body width of the participant and the other. In the experiments in which a body suit was donned by the participant or the other, the experimenter measured both the widest width of the person with the body suit on and the widest width of the person without the body suit.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest was the threshold, in terms of gap width, between no and yes responses across the 12 aperture widths for each participant as it related to the participant's widest width. Across all experiments and for each participant, we identified the largest aperture width for which a no response was observed for two thirds of the trials for this aperture width. In addition, a no response must have been observed on at least two thirds of the trials for all aperture widths smaller than this particular width. Next, we found the smallest aperture width that the participant responded to with a yes on two thirds of the trials. In addition, a yes response must have been observed on at least two thirds of the trials for all aperture widths larger than this particular width. Then, these two aperture widths (i.e., largest no and smallest yes) were averaged to find the threshold that separated the yes from the no responses.
2
The threshold estimate for self-judgments was divided by the actual width of the participant. The threshold estimate for other judgments was divided by the actual width of the other. For participants in Experiment 1 who wore the body suit, the actual width referred to their widest width while wearing the body suit. In Experiment 2 in which the others wore the body suit, the actual width referred to their width while wearing the body suit. Across all experiments, a ratio larger than 1.0 indicated that participants switched from no to yes responses when the aperture width was larger than their widest width (i.e., reporting a larger passable aperture than what was required by their body size), and a ratio smaller than 1.0 indicated that participants switched from no to yes responses when the aperture width was smaller than their widest width (i.e., reporting a smaller passable aperture than what was required by their body size).
Independent Variable
To assess the influence of another's action capabilities on one's own perceived affordances as well as the influence of one's own action capabilities on perception of others' affordances, we created a variable called the body size differential. The body size differential was created by dividing the participant's widest body width by the other's widest body width for each dyad. In Experiments 2 and 3, the widest body width was based on the body size calculated with the body suit on. This division produced a ratio that was centered at a value of 1.0 (i.e., 1 was subtracted from every ratio) and then multiplied by 10 for ease of interpretability. Therefore, a 1-unit increase from zero in the body size differential indicated that the other's body size was 10% larger than the participant's body size. Likewise, a 1-unit decrease from zero in the body size differential indicated that the other's body size was 10% smaller than the participant's body size. If the difference in body size between the participant and the other predicted the crossover point for self-judgments, then we can conclude that the other's action capabilities (being different from the participant's) had an influence on one's own perceived affordances. Likewise, if the difference in body size between the participant and the other predicted the crossover point for other judgments, then we can conclude that one's own action capabilities (being different from the other's) had an influence on the perceived affordance for another person.
Statistical Model
All analyses used multilevel modeling techniques in HLM 7.0, allowing us to include interactions between continuous and categorical predictors using estimation procedures appropriate for nested designs (i.e., repeated measurements nested within an individual). The model is a two-level, two-intercept regression in which the two intercepts correspond to the crossover points for self-and other judgments. By specifying a model with two intercepts, we were able to account for the dependency between selfand other judgments. The advantages of multilevel modeling were This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
crucial for testing the current research question to avoid potential statistical issues encountered in previous work.
3
In our primary model, Level 1 corresponded to withinparticipant predictors and Level 2 corresponded to betweenparticipants predictors. Self and other crossover points were regressed onto their respective intercepts as follows: (1) 0j , the predicted crossover point for self-judgments; and (2) 1j , the predicted crossover point for other judgments. Therefore, 0j and 1j were the predicted crossover points for self-and other judgments, respectively, when controlling for all other factors.
Level 2 in the model contained one moderator and one covariate: (1) ␥ i1 , the body size differential moderating the self and other crossover points; and (2) ␥ i2 , the order of self-/other affordance judgments was entered as a covariate to control for order effects (Ϫ0.5 ϭ self first, 0.5 ϭ other first). These two variables and two interaction terms were entered at Level 2 because they capture differences that occurred between participants.
Each level of the equation was as follows:
Level 2. For i ϭ 0 and 1
where i indexes the type of judgment (self-or other judgments) and j indexes participants. The interpretation of the coefficients for each variable follows the logic of multiple regression. For example, ␥ 00 indicates the predicted crossover point for self-judgments when all other variables are at their zero value. Therefore, ␥ 00 is the predicted crossover point for self-judgments when the participant and the other are equal in body size (body size differential [␥ 01 ] ϭ 0) and after averaging over the judgment order conditions (␥ 12 ϭ 0). The intercept for other judgments (␥ 10 ) is interpreted in the same manner, but refers to the crossover point for other judgments.
The interpretation of ␥ 01 is the change in the crossover points for self-judgments when the participant's and the other's body size differ. For example, if ␥ 01 was equal to 0.1, then this would indicate that self crossover judgments would increase by 0.1 units when the other was 10% larger than the participant. The interpretation of ␥ 11 is similar to ␥ 01 except that it is indicating a change in other crossover judgments as the body size differential changes. Finally, r 00 and r 10 are estimated random effects on the 0j and 1j coefficients. In this model, a significant random effect indicates that there was significant variability in the crossover points for self-or other judgments across participants.
Experiment 1: Judging Passability When the Participant Wears a Body Suit
We asked participants to judge their own and another's ability to pass through an aperture while wearing a body suit. This allowed for a conceptual replication of previous work on judging affordances for oneself and for others (Ramenzoni et al., 2008b ) with a different body manipulation and affordance judgment, and the manipulation generated a clear difference in passability between the participant and the other. In terms of conceptually replicating Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) , we tested whether observers were able to make passability judgments for another person. Most important, we were able to ask whether the passability of the other person can influence an observer's judgments about their own passability. Finally, this experiment changed the size of the participant's body. Several studies have shown at least partial recalibration of estimates of passability after a change to one's own body width (Franchak & Adolph, 2014; Wagman & Taylor, 2005) ; therefore, this experiment may provide additional information regarding the ability to incorporate transient changes to one's body.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five (16 women, nine men) students from the University of Utah participated in this study for psychology course credit. All participants gave informed consent and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The average width of participants while wearing the body suit was 64.27 cm (SD ϭ 2.20). On average, the body suit increased the participant's body width by 15.58 cm (SD ϭ 4.56; average 24.2% increase). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli. The other in the current study was one of six different research assistants. The average shoulder width of the other across the six research assistants was 50.50 cm (SD ϭ 4.70). The mean body size differential was Ϫ2.14 (SD ϭ 0.73), indicating that, on average, the participant's widest width while wearing the body suit was 21% larger than the other's widest width.
Procedure. Participants assigned to the body suit condition were allowed to walk down the hallway outside of the lab to gain a minimum level of experience with their new body size before beginning any trials or seeing the experiment room. All other aspects of the procedure were as described in the General Method section.
Results and Discussion
First, to replicate and extend previous work on judging affordances for oneself, we considered the self-affordance judgments after controlling for any potential body size differential effect. Due to centering, the interpretation of these results was the estimated crossover point when self and other body widths were equal. Therefore, the coefficient for ␥ 00 and ␥ 10 served as the best estimate of crossover points when there was no influence of body size differences between self and other. Our statistical model revealed that ␥ 00 ϭ 0.871, t(44) ϭ 21.4, p Ͻ .001, indicating that, on average, participants switched from no to yes responses for their own passability when the aperture was only 87% of their (new) body width. This suggests that participants judged that they could pass between aperture widths that would be too narrow for passing while wearing the body suit. Interestingly, participants 3 As discussed in the introductory section, Ramenzoni et al. (2008) ran a series of simple linear regressions, one of which attempted to test the influence of another's action capabilities on self-affordance judgments, finding that the other's action capabilities accounted for approximately 50% of the variance in self-affordance judgments. Participants made judgments about their own and another's maximum overhead reach, but the linear regressions reported included only one of these responses as the dependent variable, failing to account for the dependency across self and other responses. Therefore, it is unclear whether the estimated proportion of variance accounted for was inflated because of this dependency. In contrast, multilevel modeling techniques allowed us to account for the dependency in self-and other judgments and appropriately partition variance in a nested design (i.e., individuals nested within dyads). This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
underestimated their crossover point by 13% while the body suit increased their body width by 24%. The model also revealed that ␥ 10 ϭ 0.80, SE ϭ 0.06, t(44) ϭ 13.38, p Ͻ .001, indicating that, on average, participants switched from no to yes responses for the other's passability when the aperture width was 80% of the other's widest width. Similar to the self-affordance judgments, this suggests that participants judged that the other could pass between aperture widths that would be too narrow for passing through, after controlling for any body size differential effect.
Does the body size of another person influence judgments about one's own passability? To assess our main hypothesis that there is an influence of another's action capabilities on one's own perceived affordances, we examined the body size differential coefficient for self-judgments, as it captures the difference in size between the participant and the other. Our model did not find a significant effect of the body size differential on the self crossover point, ␥ 01 ϭ Ϫ0.031, SE ϭ 0.018, t(44) ϭ Ϫ1.78, p ϭ .08. This suggests there was no evidence that participants involved the other's body size when making passability judgments for themselves.
Does the body size of an observer influence judgments about someone else's passability? The body size differential did significantly predict the crossover point for judgments about another's passability, ␥ 11 ϭ Ϫ0.11, SE ϭ 0.027, t(44) ϭ Ϫ4.19, p Ͻ .001 (see Figure 3) , suggesting that the participants did use information about their own body size to infer the passability of another person. Specifically, participants who were larger than the other person estimated that the other person needed a larger aperture width to pass through. For example, when the participant's widest width (with the body suit) was 10% larger than the other's widest width, participants estimated that the other required an aperture width that was about 91% of the other's widest width. In contrast, when the participant and the other were the same size, participants estimated that the other required an aperture width that was 80% of the other's widest width (i.e., estimated value of ␥ 10 ).
4 This is consistent with previous research demonstrating that observers partially rely on their own body information to judge the action capabilities of others. For example, Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) found that when participants wore ankle weights (encumbering their jumping ability), they estimated lower jumping ability not only for themselves, but also for others. In our current study, as an observer's body size increased relative to the other's body size, they judged the other to need a larger aperture to pass through. These results contribute to our understanding of the social context of affordances in circumstances when participants experience a significant change to their body. For judgments of selfaffordances, we did not find the hypothesized effect of an influence of the other's body size, but it is possible that the salient change to one's own body focused attention on one's own body size, reducing the use of the other's body size information. This possibility was examined in Experiment 2. For judgments of the other's affordance, the influence of one's own body size is consistent with the findings of the Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) ankle weight study, suggesting that changing one's body or capabilities influences judgments of another's action capabilities. Finally, when controlling for size differences between self and other, the results suggest that observers did not fully incorporate the large body suit size into their self-affordance judgments, underestimating the size of the aperture needed to pass through. These results are consistent with Franchak and Adolph (2014) , who manipulated the body width of nonpregnant adults with a prosthetic "pregnancy pack" and found that without feedback, participants did not fully recalibrate their judgments of passability through a doorway.
Experiment 2: Judging Passability When the Other Wears a Body Suit
In this experiment, participants made passability judgments for themselves and another person when the other person wore a body suit. In Experiment 1, we did not find sufficient evidence suggesting that an observer's own perceived action capabilities are influenced by the action capabilities of others. It is possible that this was due to the fact that the observers wore a body suit, which increased the saliency of their own body size information. In Experiment 2, the other wore a body suit to maintain a similar body size differential, but without changing the observer's own body size. Secondarily, in Experiment 1, participants used their own body size information to inform their judgments about the other's passability; however, all previous research finding a similar effect (Ramenzoni et al., 2008b) also manipulated the observer's body (e.g., adding ankle weights). It is possible that altering one's body capabilities is a necessary condition for finding an influence of one's own capabilities on judgments of another's. This experiment served as a direct test of this hypothesis by preserving the observer's natural body size and examining effects of body size differences when the other's size has been altered. This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five (15 women, 10 men) students from the University of Utah participated for psychology course credit. All participants gave informed consent and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The average width of participants while the other wore the body suit was 50.09 cm (SD ϭ 5.59). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli. The other in the current study was one of six different research assistants. The average width of the other while wearing the body suit across the six research assistants was 64.11 cm (SD ϭ 2.83). The average body size difference between participants and the other in the body suit was Ϫ13.99 cm (SD ϭ 6.98).
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that in Experiment 1 with the exception that the other was wearing the body suit. The participant was instructed to make passability judgments for the other based on their size in the body suit and not based on their assumed natural body size. The participant never saw the other without the body suit on, and did not observe the other walk around with the body suit on.
Results and Discussion
As in Experiment 1, we assessed the crossover points for selfand other judgments when the other agent wore the body suit. First, our model demonstrated that, after controlling for any potential body size differential effect, on average, participants switched from no to yes responses for their own passability when the aperture width was 0.939 times (or 6.1% smaller than) their widest width, ␥ 00 ϭ 0.939, SE ϭ 0.046, t(44) ϭ 20.43, p Ͻ .001. This suggests that, on average, participants judged that they could pass between aperture widths that they physically could not pass between. Next, participants judged the passability for the other to be 1.08 times (or 8% larger than) their widest width, ␥ 10 ϭ 1.08, SE ϭ 0.041, t(44) ϭ 26.21, p Ͻ .001. This finding is consistent with the previous literature, demonstrating that observers can fairly accurately judge the action capabilities of others, especially when provided sufficient information relevant to the desired action (e.g., body width; Creem-Regehr et al., 2013) . Does the body size of an observer influence judgments about someone else's passability? In contrast to the findings of Experiment 1, the effect of the body size differential on crossover points for other judgments failed to reach significance, ␥ 11 ϭ Ϫ0.02, SE ϭ 0.012, t(44) ϭ Ϫ1.71, p ϭ .09 (see Figure 4) . Although it is difficult to interpret null findings, by considering this result alongside the results of Experiment 1, it appears as though observers use their own action capabilities to inform judgments about another's ability when the observer's capabilities have changed (e.g., increasing body size in our study, donning ankle weights in Ramenzoni et al., 2008b) . The change to the body may increase the saliency of one's own body information, ultimately influencing how observers perceive the action capabilities of others.
Does the body size of another person influence judgments about one's own passability? Regarding our main question, the effect of the body size differential on crossover points for selfjudgments was not significant, ␥ 01 ϭ 0.024, SE ϭ 0.014, t(44) ϭ 1.71, p ϭ .10 (see Figure 4) . Although the body size of another person does not physically specify one's own passability, given the recurring adaptive situations in which observers have to compare their own abilities with that of others to decide whether or not engage in competition (for review, see Gilbert et al., 1995) and the empirical work suggesting influences of other's potential actions on one's own motor system, we predicted this influence to be present. One possibility for the lack of effect seen in both Experiments 1 and 2 is that observers only used the action capabilities of others to inform their own action judgments when the difference in perceived ability was less extreme. More specifically, von Hippel and Trivers (2011) suggested that humans may have evolved a tendency to convince themselves and others that they are physically more capable of winning resource competitions when the true underlying abilities are fairly comparable because this would increase the chances that the competitor would back down and drastically reduce the associated risks. This is consistent with much of the social comparison literature that suggests that observers tend to not make social comparisons with others whose abilities are drastically different from their own. Therefore, in Experiment 3, we asked participants to make passability judgments for themselves and another person when no alterations to body size were present. We still expected some large body size differences across a random sampling of natural body sizes, but we also did expect that the vast majority of body size differences would be within a reasonable range, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2.
Experiment 3: Judging Passability in Natural Body Size
Participants in this experiment made passability judgments for themselves and another person while neither individual wore the body suit (i.e., both with natural body size). In Experiments 1 and 2, the body size difference between the participant and the other was potentially too extreme for the participant to consider the other's body size when making self passability judgments. Experiment 3 tested this possible explanation. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Method
Participants. Twenty-five (11 women, 14 men) students from the University of Utah participated for psychology course credit. All participants gave informed consent and were naïve to the purpose of the experiment. The average width of the participants was 52.50 cm (SD ϭ 5.86). All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli. The other in the current study was one of six different research assistants. The average width of the other across the six research assistants was 49.88 cm (SD ϭ 3.54). The average body size difference between participants and the other was Ϫ0.38 cm (SD ϭ 1.28; average body size differential of 3.8%).
Procedure. All aspects of the procedure were as described in the General Method section. Both the participant and the other completed the experiment in their natural body size.
Results and Discussion
First, our results show that participants were able to make passability judgments for themselves in their natural body size, ␥ 00 ϭ 1.024, SE ϭ 0.03, t(44) ϭ 34.6, p Ͻ .001. Participants estimated that they could pass through aperture widths that were approximately 102% of their body width. This is consistent with previous research, demonstrating that observers often judge their passability threshold to be slightly larger than their widest width (Warren & Whang, 1987) . Next, for judgments about the other's passability, participants judged the crossover point to be approximately 103% of the other's body width, ␥ 10 ϭ 1.03, SE ϭ 0.03, t(44) ϭ 34.9, p Ͻ .001. This is consistent with several studies, which found that observers are fairly accurate when judging the action capabilities of others, especially when provided with relevant and sufficient information (e.g., Ramenzoni et al., 2010) .
Does the body size of another person influence judgments about one's own passability? In testing our main question of whether the effect of the other's body size will impact selfaffordance judgments even when the difference in body size is extreme, we examined the body size differential effect in our primary model. The body size differential did predict the crossover point for self-judgments, ␥ 10 ϭ 0.08, SE ϭ 0.03, t(44) ϭ 3.18, p ϭ .003 (see Figure 5 ). That is, in contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, participants did use the body size of the other when making judgments about their own passability. Specifically, when the other's body width was 10% larger than the participant's body width, the participant required a minimum aperture width that was about 110% of their widest width. In other words, when the other was larger than the participant, the participant judged that they themselves needed a larger width to pass between. However, as in Experiment 2, the body size differential did not predict the crossover point for other judgments, ␥ 11 ϭ 0.03, SE ϭ 0.03, t(44) ϭ 0.92, p ϭ .37, suggesting that participants did not rely on their own body size information to make passability judgments for another person when body size was not manipulated.
General Discussion
The goal of the current research was to test the novel question of whether another's action capabilities would influence judgments of self-affordances. Gibson's theory of affordances states that when judging affordances for oneself, one can simply relate relevant information about one's own body to relevant environmental properties, and this strategy is perfectly reasonable in determining what is physically possible in the world. From an evolutionary perspective, humans have faced an enormous array of socially orientated adaptive problems, suggesting that we have additional motivations when determining our action capabilities in a social context other than determining our true action capabilities. For example, we might perceive an increase in our action capabilities if it leads to success in a competition for resources. Similarly, we might perceive our action capabilities to be more consistent with the abilities of those around us to aid in our ability to conform to the group. In support of this idea, we found evidence for the effect of another's body size on judgments for the self, but only for the conditions in which the participants judged with their natural body size. We discuss several theoretical accounts and additional empirical findings to explain why another's body size might influence judgments of self-affordances, why we did not observe this effect when there was a large disparity in body size between the observer and the other, and provide a broader analysis of the contributions of the current findings to an understanding of the social influences on perception and action.
Broadly, the influence of others' physical abilities on the actions we think we are capable of performing could serve an important social-cognitive function, such as social conformity or selfdeception. Social psychology has amassed a large collection of findings demonstrating social conformity in humans across a wide variety of scenarios (for review, see Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004) . It is possible that participants in the current experiments were conforming to the current social situation, yielding self-affordance judgments that were biased away from a veridical response and toward a response more fitting for the other. A second socialcognitive function, self-deception, is thought to have evolved to enhance individuals' ability to convince others that they are more capable of winning a competition for resources or mates than reality might suggest (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011) . In other This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
words, if people truly believe the lie they are about to tell, the better they can hide any hint that the information is inaccurate. Importantly, both social conformity and self-deception have the capacity to produce thoughts and behaviors that are not veridical. This is a necessary feature of any functional explanation for why observers would use information about another individual's physical capabilities when determining their own opportunities for action, especially when this leads to inaccurate judgments. There is neurologically based evidence for the idea that another's actions, or potential for action, may influence an observer's own action capabilities. For example, research on the presence and functionality of mirror neurons suggests that many of the same brain regions involved in performing our own actions might be involved in perceiving actions performed by others (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) . "Mirror" or "motor resonance" systems predict that viewers understand others' actions by matching or emulating the actions (Iacoboni et al., 2005; Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, & Haselager, 2011) . Although our context of affordance judgments involved decisions about possible actions and not the observation of actions, it is possible that motor resonance was involved in inferring and predicting future actions for oneself and for others (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005) . However, given the lack of actual actions performed (both by the observer and the other agent), caution should be taken in claims about motor resonance. Future research could use our affordance judgment paradigm but allow for the observation of overt actions of the agent to test whether the effects of other's affordances on self-judgments generalize to situations in which an observer actually perceives the other's actions.
Related work on joint actions supports the notion that neural representations for actions are shared in order to coordinate goals and movements with one another (Newman-Norlund, Noordzij, Meulenbroek, & Bekkering, 2007) . However, for joint actions, it is important to consider that complementary, sometimes opposite, actions of the partner are critical to understand in order to coordinate actions for a common goal. There is some suggestion that this integrative component of joint actions is supported by neural mechanisms outside of the putative mirror neuron system (Kokal, Gazzola, & Keysers, 2009 ). At a more functional level of analysis, information-based accounts also support the direct use of environmental information in a synergistic way that allows for two actors to couple their actions (Riley, Richardson, Shockley, & Ramenzoni, 2011) . Although our task did not involve a goal to explicitly act with another agent, the mechanisms supporting such functions may lead to an implicit use of other's capabilities.
There is recent experimental evidence in social embodied perception that indirectly relates to our findings by demonstrating that the social context involving other individuals can influence perceptual judgments and action decisions. For example, Schnall, Harber, Stefanucci, and Proffitt (2008) asked participants to estimate the geographical slant of a hill either in the presence of a friend or alone. The authors found that participants estimated the slant of the hill to be shallower when with a friend or even when simply thinking about a friend prior to making the perceptual estimate. Ronay and von Hippel (2010) found that male skateboarders took more physical risk in performing tricks when in the presence of a female observer compared with a male observer. Not only did the increased risk-taking lead to more successes, it also led to more failures (i.e., crashes), suggesting that the social context can influence actual actions performed by an observer, even when those actions lead to physical harm. In addition, Chambon (2009) found that observers overestimated both slant and distance after being primed by stereotypes about older adults. With respect to the social context of affordances, although there are very few studies on locomotor space affordances such as our task of passing through an aperture, there is an emerging literature on object/hand-based tasks performed with others, showing that object affordances change in the presence of others (Ferri, Campione, Dalla Volta, Gianelli, & Gentilucci, 2011; Scorolli, Miatton, Wheaton, & Borghi, 2014) . Thus, although historically one's sense of the body has been framed in the context of the individual, such as control over one's own actions (e.g., Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006) , there is increasing evidence supporting the social influence on body perception and action. Our current studies contribute to this domain by suggesting that the potential actions of others can change the way we think about our own actions.
It is important to note that we did not observe the effect of the other's body size on self-judgments in Experiment 1 when the participant wore a large body suit. By asking participants to change their body size in Experiment 1, we effectively made this a source of salient information. As such, it is possible that participants were not influenced by the other's body size simply because they were more focused on incorporating the change to their body. The saliency of their own body size may also explain why participants used their own body size to infer the capabilities of the other. This finding is consistent with that of Ramenzoni et al. (2008b) , which showed that participants who donned ankle weights while judging maximum jump-to-reach for themselves and for another rescaled their judgments of what another could do based on the change in their own ability.
We also did not observe the effect of the other's body size on self-judgments in Experiment 2 when the other wore a large body suit. In this experiment, the participant's own body size was not made more salient as in Experiment 1, suggesting that the saliency of the body information may not necessarily explain our pattern of findings. Instead, it is possible that the participants in Experiments 1 and 2 did not use the other's body size to inform their own judgments because the body size disparity was very large and much larger than in Experiment 3. Both self-deception and social conformity require some basic level of comparison between the observer and others, and there is evidence that humans do not make social comparisons when the difference in abilities is too large (Festinger, 1954) . For example, people are not likely to compare their basketball playing abilities with those of LeBron James because of the large disparity between abilities. If we consider this in light of our tendency to engage in self-deception or social conformity, it becomes apparent that (1) no matter how much we attempt to convince ourselves and others that we can play basketball better than LeBron James, almost no one will believe us, and (2) no matter how much effort we put into playing basketball on LeBron James's level, we are not likely to make the same basketball team. Similarly, it is possible that participants in our experiment did not use the body size information of the other to inform their own passability judgments when the body size disparity was very large (Experiments 1 and 2) because it would not be an effective use of self-deception or social conformity strategies. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
Beyond the findings of another's influence on self-affordance judgments, we have also established a replication and extension of work on judging self-and other affordances in the context of a natural body size versus a change to one's own body. Here, we found that when controlling for size differences between the self and other, our data revealed judgments of self and other passability to correspond to actual passability when the observer's body was its natural size. In addition, we found that the participants who wore a large body suit (Experiment 1) did not fully incorporate this body size change into their passability judgments. Previous research has been mixed as to how quickly and how well participants incorporate a change to their size when giving judgments about potential actions. In several studies in which participants gained information about the degree to which their capabilities had changed (e.g., sway in Mark & Eogele, 1987 , or dynamic touch in Wagman & Taylor, 2005 ; feedback by performing action in Franchak & Adolph, 2014) , affordance judgments were recalibrated rather quickly. Other studies showed that even after weeks of practice, participants were unable to incorporate a change to their body size (Higuchi, Cinelli, Greig, & Patla, 2006) . Most recently, Franchak and Adolph (2014) found that when participants were not provided feedback regarding their new body size by actually walking through doorways, they were unable to completely recalibrate their passability judgments. Overall, it is still an open question as to how well observers recalibrate changes to their body, and whether recalibration varies across affordances and types of changes to the body.
It is interesting to note that when anorexic patients were asked to judge whether an aperture afforded passage for themselves and another, they estimated needing a larger margin of error to pass through for themselves, but did not translate this to judgments about the other (Guardia et al., 2010) . Thus, changes in body size that are manipulated or preexisting may have different effects on affordance judgments for the self and others. Future research may consider providing more feedback to the participants such that they demonstrate full recalibration in their own affordance judgments prior to having them make affordance judgments for another person. Follow-up work might also consider investigating these effects more carefully in populations that often report experiencing changes in their perceived body size (such as eating disorders or obesity).
Finally, one important limitation in the current experimental design is that we were only able to increase the body size of the participant or the other, creating inconsistent body size differential distributions across the three conditions. Although there is no apparent way to decrease the body size of a person in the real world, virtual environments would allow for such a manipulation. Furthermore, this would allow for a design in which the participant views many different models that systematically vary in body size. Future work could consider using virtual environments to increase and decrease the body size of the participant's virtual body and the virtual body of another (Piryankova et al., 2014) .
Overall, our results lend support to the notion that social-level variables should be considered in traditional models of perception and action. Whereas Gibson's (1979) definition of affordances generalized to multiple viewpoints, supporting the function of judging other's affordances, traditional affordance theories do not typically incorporate social information within the perception and action paradigm, and none have investigated the role of other's affordances on self-judgments. Future work should investigate whether the actual performance of visually guided actions is also altered by the social context, as this would directly test social influences on the perception-action system (see Coello, 2014, and Quesque, Lewkowicz, Delevoye-Turrell & Coello, 2013 , for some initial work on this question).
